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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-AI FORNEY & CLIENT: DENIAL
OF ADMISSION TO THE BAR BECAUSE OF PAST
CONDUCT AND PRESENT MORAL CHARACTER
Layon v. North Dakota State Bar Board,
458 N.W.2d 501 (N.D. 1990).
Frank Layon applied for admission to the North Dakota Bar in
1988 after graduating from California Western School of Law.'
Following an investigation by the North Dakota Board of Bar
Examiners (the Board), an informal hearing was held on June 15,
1989, which Layon and the members of the Board attended.2 The
Board concluded that Layon lacked the good moral character nec-
essary to practice law.3 The Board gave the following reasons for
its conclusion: "1. Unlawful conduct; 2. It appears you may
have made false statements and did not fully disclose information
requested in the admission application; 3. Fraud and misrepre-
sentation; 4. Neglect of financial responsibilities; 5. Compulsive
gambling (emotional instability)."'4 Layon then requested a formal
hearing pursuant to Rule 6(BX2) of the North Dakota Supreme
Court Admission to Practice Rules (North Dakota Admission
Rules)., After a formal hearing was held, the Board confirmed its
prior decision that Layon not be admitted to the North Dakota
Bar.' Layon then filed a petition for review with the Supreme
1. Layon v. North Dakota State Bar Bd., 458 N.W.2d 501, 502 (N.D. 1990).
2. Id.
3. Id. Layon had passed the bar examination, thereby satisfying the academic
requirement. Id. The Board informed Layon of the reasons for his lack of good moral
character through notification dated June 21, 1989. Id.
4. Id. In response to the bar application question whether he had ever been charged
with a crime, Layon answered, "Yes," mentioning a theft of property charge. Id. at 503-04.
Layon went on to explain that he was acquitted of the charge at trial. Id. at 504. This was
his only response to the question. Id. Layon answered, "No" to question 16b of the bar
application, which states: "Have you ever been charged with violation of any motor vehicle
law (excluding parking offenses)?" Id. After an investigation, the Board discovered many
criminal charges that Layon had failed to disclose:
1. 07-17-69-Illegal possession and open container.
2. 11-17-76-Aggravated promotion of prostitution and gambling (Texas
Courts).
3. 03-31-82-Forgery.
4. 06-22-82-NSF check ($9,172.00).
5. 08-23-82-NSF check ($6,800.00).
6. 09-20-82-Forgery (2 counts).
7. 06-07-83-Theft of Property (2 counts).
8. 01-18-88-No account check.
Id.
5. Id. at 502. Rule 6(BX2) of the North Dakota Admission Rules provides that "[w]ithin
30 days after the mailing of the notification, the applicant may demand a formal hearing by
written petition directed to the State Bar Board." N.D. R. ADMIS. TO PRAC. 6(BX2) (1992).
6. Layou, 458 N.W.2d at 503. The Board's decision was by a written opinion dated
November 3, 1989. Id.
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Court of North Dakota pursuant to Rule 6(C) of the North Dakota
Admission Rules, arguing that he had been denied due process,
that the Board erred, and that he had met his burden of proving
good moral character.7 The North Dakota Supreme Court
affirmed the Board's decision and held that Layon was not denied
due process; that the evidence of prior misconduct-along with
deception in financial matters which occurred in 1986 and 1988
and the false information provided on the application-was not
too remote to prove present moral character; and that Layon's affi-
davits of support did not overcome the evidence against him.8
The requirement that attorneys possess "good moral charac-
ter" has developed because of the necessity to safeguard the legal
rights of those who rely on attorneys for representation and
advice.' Another reason for character standards, though not as
well pronounced, is the bar's interest in preserving a professional
body and a respectable societal image of the profession. 10 Bar
spokespersons have stated that this objective can be achieved by
"eliminating the diseased dogs before they inflict the first bite.""
Entry restrictions that are intended to protect the public, how-
7. Id. Rule 6(CX1) provides: "An applicant who, after a formal hearing, receives notice
that the State Bar Board will recommend against admission or has given a negative decision
on licensure may request review of that recommendation or decision by the Supreme
Court." N.D. R. ADMIS. TO PRAC. 6(CX1) (1992). Layon raised the following issues with the
Court:
1. WAS THE APPLICANT DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW AS A RESULT
OF THE ACTIONS OF THE BOARD AND THE PROCEDURE WHICH WAS
FOLLOWED IN THIS MAT'ER?
2. DID THE BOARD ERR IN DENYING THE APPLICANT'S MOTION FOR
IMMEDIATE ADMISSION TO THE NORTH DAKOTA BAR?
3. DID THE APPLICANT MEET THE REQUIRED STANDARD OF
PROVING HIS PROPER MORAL CHARACTER BY A PREPONDERANCE OF
THE EVIDENCE DURING THE HEARING IN THIS MATTER?
Layon, 458 N.W.2d at 503.
8. Layon, 458 N.W.2d at 508-12. Layon argued that he was denied due process
because he was not afforded notice specific enough for him to develop a proper defense. Id.
at 507. The court stated that although the reasons in the notice were not models of
specificity, he had the opportunity to request that they be made more specific-which he
failed to do. Id. at 508. Thus, the court found that he was afforded all the vestiges of due
process. Id.
9. Eric Neisser, Conscientious Draft Refusal, Marijuana Possession, and the Bar
Admission Requirement, BAR EXAM., Aug. 1971, at 7. See State v. Cannon, 240 N.W. 441
(Wis. 1932). Perhaps the Cannon court recites the reasons for character standards best:
Realizing that those who assume to practice law without the proper learning and
good moral character have it in their power to work great harm upon those who
have a right to assume that they are properly qualified to advise them in legal
matters and to protect them in their legal rights, the legislature has very
properly prescribed certain qualifications which must be possessed by those
whom become licensed as attorneys at law.
Id. at 444.
10. Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Character as a Professional Credential, 94 YALE L.J. 491,
509 (1985).
11. Donald T. Weckstein, Recent Developments in the Character and Fitness
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ever, are often ineffective in weeding out those who engage in
inappropriate conduct. 12 Thus, the fallout of these ineffective
measures is a society that demands more protection from immoral
and dishonest lawyers. 13
Historically, an individual's moral fitness or character to prac-
tice law has been an incontrovertible credential. 4 The roots of
moral character as a requirement to enter the legal profession
date back as early as the Roman Theodesian Code. 15 The Anglo-
American ties to moral character extend as far back as thirteenth
century England,'" when lawyers were subject to disbarment if
they did not take an oath to "discharge 'their duty with care, dili-
gence and fidelity.' ,,'v Societal concern for the good moral char-
acter of lawyers seems to have emerged around the mid-
seventeenth century, when governmental bodies began creating
character requirements for admission to the bar.'
In the United States, the requirement of good moral character
is believed to have arisen because of the fiduciary relationship
between a lawyer and client.'9 In a concurrence in Schware v.
Board of Bar Examiners,2 ° Justice Frankfurter wrote: "From a
profession charged with such responsibilities there must be
exacted those qualities of ... the strictest observance of fiduciary
responsibility, that have, throughout the centuries, been compen-
diously described as 'moral character.' "21
The relationship of lawyer and client, as described by Justice
Frankfurter, requires a higher degree of fiduciary responsibility
than that of business partners.22 For example, in Mailath v.
Oklahoma Board of Bar Examiners,3 an applicant was denied
admission to the bar because he had induced clients to become
business partners by concealing facts that would have in all
Qualifications for the Practice of Law: The Law School Role; The Political Dissident, BAR
EXAM., Aug. 1971, at 23.
12. R. J. Gerber, Moral Character: Inquiries Without Character, BAR EXAM., May
1988, at 15.
13. C. Graham Carothers, Character and Fitness: A Need for an Increased Perception,
BAR EXAM., Aug. 1982, at 25.
14. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 248 (1957) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
15. Gerber, supra note 12, at 14.
16. Id.
17. Orin N. Carter, Ethics of the Legal Profession, 9 ILL. L. REV. 297, 308 (1914).
18. Rhode, supra note 10, at 496.
19. Gerber, supra note 12, at 15.
20. 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
21. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 247 (1957) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
22. Mailath v. Oklahoma Bd. of Bar Examiners, 752 P.2d 803, 810 (Okla. 1988).
23. 752 P.2d 803 (Okla. 1988).
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probability caused them to refrain from such an association. 24 As a
result, the Mailath court found that the applicant lacked the "ethi-
cal qualifications" necessary for admittance to the bar.25
Bankruptcy, as opposed to breach of fiduciary duty, has rarely
been a reason to deny an individual admission to the bar.26 How-
ever, on occasion courts have denied admission based on frivolous
bankruptcy filings. In In re Gahan,28 for example, the Minnesota
Supreme Court denied an applicant admission to the bar because
he filed bankruptcy in order to get out of paying his student loans
even though he was suffering no serious financial hardship.29 The
court stated that such blatant financial irresponsibility showed a
lack of moral duty to others.30 Therefore, the court concluded
that his act of filing bankruptcy for no sound reason demonstrated
a lack of good moral character.3'
Along the same lines as moral character requirements, profes-
sional rules of ethics emerged in 1887, when Alabama adopted a
code of ethics for lawyers.3 2 The American Bar Association (ABA)
followed suit in 1908 by adopting the Cannons of Professional Eth-
ics, which were based largely on Alabama's code.33 The Cannons
have since been revised, the first change appearing in 1969, when
the ABA adopted the Model Code of Professional Responsibility,
24. Mailath v. Oklahoma Bd. of Bar Examiners, 752 P.2d 803, 809 (Okla. 1988).
Mailath, the applicant, failed to inform his clients of important facts relating to their
potential liability in business ventures. Id. Mailath also did not afford his clients the
opportunity to sell an interest in the business ventures to new partners, while all along he
was disposing of his interest and liability. Id.
25. Id. at 810.
26. Martha E. Raymond, The Effect of Bankruptcy on Bar Admission, BAR EXAM., Feb.
1988, at 24.
27. See In re G.W.L., 364 So. 2d 454, 459 (Fla. 1978) (denying an applicant's admission
to the bar because he filed bankruptcy without a thorough job search, and he was not under
any real economic hardship); In re Taylor, 647 P.2d 462, 466 (Or. 1982) (denying admission
to the applicant because he did not make any effort to repay his student financial loans);
Raymond, supra note 26, at 24 (Bar examiners view the reasons for filing bankruptcy with a
suspicious eye.). But see In re Kwasnik, 508 So. 2d 338, 341 (Fla. 1987) (holding that the
failure to pay back a forgiven debt cannot be a basis to deny admission to the bar).
28. 279 N.W.2d 826 (Minn. 1979).
29. In re Gahan, 279 N.W.2d 826, 831 (Minn. 1979). Gahan was unemployed for almost
two months before he filed for bankruptcy. Id. at 827. The court discovered, however, that
although he was unemployed for a time, his gross income was between $1,250 and $1,500
monthly, while his expenses were approximately $500. Id. at 831.
30. Id. The court recognized that "such flagrant financial irresponsibility reflects
adversely on an applicant's ability to manage financial matters and reflects adversely on his
commitment to the rights of others, thereby reflecting adversely on his fitness to the
practice of law." Id.
31. Id. at 832.
32. Carter, supra note 17, at 308. The Alabama code was primarily based on the
lectures of Judge Sharwood, which were collected and published in 1954, and David
Hoffman's "Fifty Resolutions" contained in his two volume book, A Course of Legal Study,
published in 1836. A.B.A., PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: MODEL RULES AND CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT, MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY ix (1984).
33. PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 32, at ix.
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followed by a second change in 1983 by the adoption of the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct.34 The Model Rules are intended to
serve as an exemplar for states.35 While ethical rules inside the
legal profession have developed in the United States, and educa-
tional standards have differed, good moral character has remained
a die-hard requirement for admittance to the bar.
36
The right to admit persons to practice belongs to the states
and their courts.37 Every state requires an individual to be of good
moral character in order to be admitted to the bar.38 The stan-
dard of good moral character, however, cannot be created arbi-
trarily or discriminatorily without violating the Due Process or
Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.3 9
The fact is, however, that "'good moral character' is an elu-
sive, ill-defined concept. '40 Nonetheless, good moral character
has been found to embody the ambiguous qualities of "honesty,
fairness, candor, trustworthiness, [and] observance of fiduciary
responsibility .... -14 In addition, there is not a black letter defini-
tion of good moral character; rather, each case must be deter-
mined by its own facts.42
Lack of candor or misinformation on the bar application raises
the presumption of bad moral character because it is believed
these acts of dishonesty are likely to continue in the professional
role. 43 Therefore, lack of candor in an application for admission is
viewed as a serious violation and is quite often viewed as more
34. Id. at x.
35. Id. at 9.
36. Rhode, supra note 10, at 493.
37. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 248 (1957) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring). The North Dakota legislature has delegated to the Supreme Court of North
Dakota the power to admit persons to the bar. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-11-02 (1991). "The
power to admit persons to practice as attorneys and counselors at law in the courts of this
state is vested in the Supreme Court." Id.
38. THE BAR EXAMINERS HANDBOOK 122 (Stuart Duhl, ed., 2d ed. 1980).
39. Schware, 353 U.S. at 249. The court in Schware stated: "A State can require high
standards of qualification, such as good moral character or proficiency in its law ... but any
qualification must have a rational connection with the applicant's fitness .. .to practice
law." Id. at 239. Upon review, the burden is on the applicant to prove good moral
character by a preponderance of the evidence. BAR EXAMINERS HANDBOOK, supra note
38, at 122.
40. Carothers, supra note 13, at 25.
41. Pacheco v. State Bar of California, 741 P.2d 1138, 1139 (Cal. 1987) (citing RULES
REGULATING ADMISSION TO PRACTICE LAW IN CALIFORNIA, Rule x § 101, subd.(a)).
42. In re Klahr, 433 P.2d 977, 979 (Ariz. 1987). It has been postulated that a more
appropriate inquiry into moral character should be "an inclusion of acts and conduct which
would cause a reasonable man to have substantial doubts about an individual's honesty
[and] fairness...." In re G.W.L., 364 So. 2d 454, 458 (Fla. 1978).
43. See generally, Eric H. Miller, Annotation, Falsehoods, Misrepresentations,
Impersonations, and Other Irresponsible Conduct as Bearing on Requisite Good Moral
Character for Admission to Bar, 30 A.L.R. 4th 1020 § 5 (1984) (a collection of American
cases concerning nondisclosure and the relation to lack of moral character).
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serious than the act the candidate is trying to conceal. 44 For exam-
ple, an applicant for the North Carolina Bar was denied admission
because he failed to disclose material matters on his application.45
The North Carolina Supreme Court stated that an individual who
does not take care in filling out his or her application is not likely
to exhibit any greater care when representing clients.4 6 More spe-
cifically, the court recognized that lack of candor fails to show
maturity and professional discipline necessary to prove good moral
character.47 Thus, efforts to deceive in the application procedure
may be seen as blatant dishonesty that is likely to continue in the
future.48
In North Dakota, an applicant must apply to take the bar
examination provided by the State Bar Board.49 One of the basic
requirements to practice is that the candidate be of good moral
character.50 A character evaluation of each applicant is made by
the Board, after which a recommendation is made to the North
Dakota Supreme Court, and notification of the result is then sent
to the applicant.5 ' If the Board makes a negative recommenda-
tion, the applicant may then request a formal hearing.52 If the rec-
ommendation remains negative after the formal hearing, the
applicant may request a review by the North Dakota Supreme
Court.53
In Layon v. State Bar Board,54 the North Dakota Supreme
Court reviewed the present moral character of Frank Layon, tak-
ing into consideration the findings of the State Bar Board.55 Layon
44. Siegel v. Committee of Bd. Examiners, 514 P.2d 967, 983 (Cal. 1973).
45. In re Legg, 386 S.E.2d 174 (N.C. 1989). The applicant had failed to disclose several
debts that the application required him to reveal. Id. at 175. He had also failed to disclose
suits in which he was personally involved, and he failed to list on the original application
memberships in professional organizations to which he belonged. Id. at 175-76.
46. Id. at 183.
47. Id.
48. Leonard W. Copeland, Note, Admission and Reinstatement of Felons to the Bar:
West Virginia and the General Rule, 91 W. VA. L. REV. 451, 477 (1988-89).
49. N.D. R. ADMIS. TO PRAC. 3(AX2) (1992). Rule 3(AX2) provides: "(A) All applicants
for admission by bar examination . . . (2) shall apply to take the examination on forms
provided by the State Bar Board." Id.
50. Id. at R. I(A). Rule 1(A) provides: "No person may be admitted to practice as an
attorney and counselor at law in this state unless the person: . . . (2) is of good moral
character." Id.
51. Id. at R. 3(D). Rule 3(D) provides: "Taking into consideration the results of the bar
examination, along with the applicant's moral character, the State Bar Board shall make
recommendations to the Supreme Court regarding the admission of each applicant to the
Bar." Id.
52. Id. at R. 6(BX2). For the text of Rule 6(BX2), see supra note 5.
53. Id. at R. 6(C).
54. 458 N.W.2d 501 (N.D. 1990).
55. Layon v. State Bar Bd., 458 N.W.2d 501, 509 (N.D. 1990). The comments to the
Statutes and Rules Governing Admission to the Bar indicate that the applicant's present
974 [Vol. 68:969
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argued that he proved, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
he possessed good moral character and that the Board's reliance
on his past conduct was too remote in time to prove his present
moral character.5 6 The court found that Layon's conduct relating
to deception in financial matters, which occurred in 1986 and
1988, was not too remote to prove his present moral character. 57
In addition, the court found that the false information Layon gave
on the bar application was deceitful and not completely candid,
both of which also went to prove his present character.58 The
court furthered its position by stating that neither the letters of
support nor the testimony in his favor were enough to overcome
the evidence of his prior bad acts.5 9
The court suggested that if Layon had truly wanted to prove
his present good moral character and rehabilitation, he should
moral character should be considered. STATE BAR BD., STATUTES AND RULES GOVERNING
ADMISSION TO THE BAR 9 (N.D. State Bar Bd., Bismarck, ND, 1990). The comments
provide, in relevant part:
The Admission to Practice Rules of the North Dakota Supreme Court require
(Rule 1A.2) that all admittees be of good moral character .... The State Bar
Board will determine that an applicant's moral character is such as permits a
positive recommendation when the applicant's record of conduct indicates that
the applicant is presently honest, trustworthy, diligent, and reliable. Those traits
in an applicant suggest that the applicant is one who, if otherwise admissible, will
properly perform the obligations a member of the bar owes to clients, the courts,
opposing parties and counsel, and the public generally.
Id. For the Board's reasons for finding Layon lacking in moral character, see supra note 4
and accompanying text.
56. Layon, 458 N.W.2d at 508-09. Layon also argued that he was denied due process
because the allegations made against him were too vague to permit him to prepare a
sufficient defense. Id. at 507. The court recognized, however, that while the allegations
were not "models of specificity," Layon could have requested that they be made more
specific. Id. at 508. The court went on to state that the applicants are allowed access to the
files on which the Board bases their findings. Id. The court stated that not only did Layon
have sufficient notice and an opportunity to be heard, but he also was fully aware of his past
conduct. Id. The court concluded, therefore, that Layon was given more than adequate
due process. Id.
57. Id. at 510. Layon argued that he had been rehabilitated. Id. at 509. However, the
Board discovered "conversion and misappropriation of funds" of stock options in 1986. Id.
at 504. Layon had represented to a stock broker that his approximate income on March 12,
1986 was $70,000 to $100,000 and that his net worth was from $1,500,000 to $2,000,000; in
actuality, the Board discovered that his income was $12,000 to $14,000. Id. at 504-05. In a
letter dated May 4, 1988, he continued to justify his belief of his higher net worth to the
stock broker. Id. at 505. When the Board asked him if he believed the information given to
the broker was false, he stated: "In looking back on it, yes .... .- Id.
58. Id. Question 20 of the bar application asks: "Have you ever been treated or
confined for mental or emotional disorders . . . ?" Layon answered "No." Id. at 506.
However, the Board discovered, through several witnesses testifying on Layon's behalf, that
he had a problem with gambling and that he had in fact undergone treatment. Id. at 507.
59. Id. at 512. There were 20 letters of support from judges, attorneys and other
professionals. Id. at 511. However, Layon's character witnesses were personal friends and
relatives who had limited knowledge of his background. Brief of the Respondent at 13.
Layon v. State Bar Bd., 458 N.W.2d 501 (N.D. 1990) (No. 890303). One of his witnesses
confessed, after hearing other testimony, that there were certain past events in Layon's life
of which he was not aware. Id.
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have been completely honest in his application, especially in his
response concerning his treatment for a compulsive gambling
addiction. 60 The court stated it was appropriate to view gambling
addictions when deciding if an applicant can be considered "trust-
worthy and dependable" in the fiduciary relationship between
lawyer and client.6 1
In addition to considering gambling addictions as a sign of a
lack of trustworthiness or dependability, the Supreme Court Rules
also permit examination of "evidence of drug or alcohol depen-
dency" in moral character determinations.6 2 If past substance
abuse is considered by the North Dakota Supreme Court, what
type of standards or requirements will the court look to for gui-
dance when deciding if an applicant has rehabilitated himself?
Perhaps decisions from other jurisdictions will serve as the best
guides.
In In re Strait,63 the New Jersey Supreme Court reviewed an
applicant's past crimes and candor in determining moral charac-
ter, but viewed his addiction to drugs and alcohol as the main con-
cern regarding his admission to the bar.64 The court was primarily
concerned with whether or not the applicant had been rehabili-
tated.65 The court alluded to a variety of areas relating to the
applicant's rehabilitation, such as his candor concerning the addic-
tion, whether or not he had been in some sort of treatment facility,
commitment to recover, expert testimony regarding his recovery,
the connection to the addiction and prior bad conduct, and his
community service.6 6 After review, the court admitted the appli-
cant subject to certain rehabilitation conditions prescribed by the
60. Id. at 507. The comments to Bar Board booklet, Statutes and Rules Governing
Admission to the Bar, provide, in relevant part:
In determining whether the present moral character of an applicant qualifies
her or him for a positive recommendation, the State Bar Board will assess the
weight and significance of any inappropriate conduct by considering the
following factors:
the applicant's candor in the admission process, the materiality of any omission
or misrepresentations ....
STATE BAR BD., STATUTES AND RULES GOVERNING ADMISSION TO THE BAR 10 (N.D. State
Bar Bd., Bismarck, ND 1990).
61. Layon, 458 N.W.2d at 507. Layon professed that he had control of his gambling
problem. Id. He had testified that he had some treatment, which was contrary to his
answer on the bar application. Id.
62. SEE STATE BAR BD., STATUTES AND RULES GOVERNING ADMISSION TO THE BAR
cmt. (N.D. State Bar Bd., Bismarck, ND 1990).
63. 577 A.2d 149 (N.J. 1990).
64. In re Strait, 577 A.2d 149, 157 (N.J. 1990). The applicant had been addicted to
drugs and alcohol since adolescence. Id. at 149.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 157-58.
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Review Panel."
In some cases, however, rehabilitation is not enough. For
example, in In re Glenville,68 the Illinois Supreme Court denied
an applicant's admission, stating that prior bad acts connected to
alcoholism were not lessened by the applicant's recent good con-
duct and recovery. 69 The applicant argued that the prior bad acts
were related to his alcoholism and alcohol-related blackouts that
resulted in his loss of memory. ° The applicant contended further
that the hearing panel arbitrarily dismissed the expert testimony
regarding his alcohol-related blackouts.71  The court recognized
that the panel had given the expert testimony credence, but stated
that, in the final analysis, the members of the panel were free to
choose whether or not to believe the testimony.72 The court held,
therefore, that although the applicant had overcome his alcohol
addiction, his prior bad acts were not diminished by his
recovery.73
In another recent case concerning alcohol dependency, In re
Haukebo" 4 the Minnesota Supreme Court remanded for reconsid-
eration a decision by the Minnesota Board of Bar Examiners which
denied an applicant admission based on an unsatisfactory chemical
67. Id. at 158. The Review Panel's recommendations, which were to be in place for a
period of three years, stated:
1. that he engages in the practice of law in New Jersey only as a partner,
shareholder, associate, or employee of at least one other member of the New
Jersey Bar or, in the alternative, as a solo practitioner under the supervision of a
proctor, who is a member of the New Jersey Bar;
2. that he attends at least one meeting per week of Lawyers concerned with
Lawyers (LCL) and five meetings per week of Alcoholics Anonymous (AA), and
have another member of LCL and another member of AA confirm his
attendance at the meeting(s);
3. that he undergoes and bears the expense of random urine testing for the
presence of alcohol, cocaine, heroine, and marijuana; and
4. that he, another member of LCL, and another member of AA submit
quarterly affidavits to the Committee, which affidavits are to demonstrate Strait's
ongoing compliance with the above conditions.
Id. at 156.
68. 565 N.E.2d 623 (Ill. 1990).
69. In re Glenville, 565 N.E.2d 623, 629 (Ill. 1990). Though the applicant had a long
history of arrests, the hearing panel and the court viewed the conduct of the applicant in
March 1984 as the most important aspect relating to his present moral character. Id. at 628.
As a result of his conduct in March 1984, the applicant was "charged with home invasion,
armed robbery, residential burglary, armed violence and theft." Id. at 625. At the trial,
however, the applicant was found guilty of only theft. Id.
70. Id. at 625.
71. Id. at 626. The applicant had a clinical psychologist testify to the fact that he had
suffered a black-out on March 28, 1984, because of overconsumption of alcohol, and since
that time, he had fully recovered. Id. The applicant also had a senior-certified-addictions
counselor testify to the fact that he would not perform immoral or violent acts when sober.
Id.
72. Id. at 627.
73. Id. at 629.
74. 352 N.W.2d 752 (Minn. 1984).
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dependency evaluation.75 Because of three driving while intoxi-
cated convictions between 1979 and 1981, the Board ordered that
the applicant undergo three chemical dependency evaluations,
two from agencies the Board chose and one from an agency cho-
sen by the applicant." The Board concluded from the evaluation
that there was insufficient evidence that the applicant had the req-
uisite moral character necessary for admission. 77 On review, how-
ever, the court was unclear whether the Board concentrated on
the applicant's behavioral pattern in making its decision, or
whether the Board simply used the addiction to determine his
moral character. 8 Consequently, the court remanded the case,
stating that an applicant's moral character should not be decided
completely on the individual's addiction to alcohol, but upon his or
her "past and present pattern of conduct."' 9
The decision by the Minnesota Supreme Court was an appro-
priate one. Alcoholism is generally thought to be a disease, not a
flaw in one's character.80 Thus, standing alone, alcoholism should
not constitute a deficiency in an individual's ability to practice
law."' A blatant denial of an applicant because of alcoholism will
serve only to stigmatize the individual, while at the same time
ignoring the disease itself.8 2 Accordingly, an applicant who has a
substance addiction should not be viewed as untrustworthy or
undependable based purely upon the addiction.
Moreover, the North Dakota Supreme Court should not
regard an applicant who is addicted to alcohol as lacking in moral
character. Rather, North Dakota should follow the Minnesota
Supreme Court's view in Haukebo, judging the moral character of
an individual addicted to alcohol on his or her behavioral pat-
tern. 3 When faced with an applicant who has satisfied the general
75. In re Haukebo, 352 N.W.2d 752, 754 (Minn. 1984). The Board of Law Examiners
allowed the applicant to take the examination but conditioned his entry on passing a
chemical evaluation or successfully completing a treatment program. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. Two of the evaluations conducted by agencies chosen by the Board stated that
the applicant was chemically dependent, while the evaluation conducted by the agency of
the applicant's choosing stated that these incidents were related to mental health factors
and not alcohol addictions. Id. The court referred to the Board's action as a "conscientious
performance of its screening function." Id. at 755.
78. Id. at 756. The court concluded that an applicant's admission is determined
according to his or her behavioral pattern. Id.
79. Id. at 755.
80. Jerome Braun, Some Thoughts on Alcoholism and Admission to the Bar, BAR
EXAM., May 1988, at 10.
81. Id. at 7.
82. Id. at 10.
83. See In re Haukebo, 352 N.W.2d at 756.
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requirements of the Bar, 4 but is found to be addicted to alcohol or
to have alcohol-related problems, an appropriate solution for the
North Dakota Supreme Court would be to admit the applicant
upon the successful completion of a treatment or counseling
program.85
The North Dakota Bar has recently adopted policies which
may aid the court and the Board in discovering applicants' addic-
tion-related problems. The new policy requires all applicants to
complete an application form from the National Conference of
Bar Examiners (NCBE) so that a character evaluation can be con-
ducted."' The application is more in-depth than the application
used by the North Dakota Bar Board.87 For example, on the
NCBE form, there are fourteen questions concerning character
and fitness.8 8 In light of this new policy, the applications will likely
reveal more information regarding an applicant's moral character.
Thus, the Board will likely consider dependency problems, such as
substance abuse or Mr. Layon's gambling addiction, which, consid-
ered alone, may be unrelated to an individuals moral character.
Michael D. Fritz
84. N.D.R. ADMIS. TO PRAC. 1 (1992). Rule 1, lists the general requirements for
admission to the bar:
(A) No person may be admitted to practice as an attorney and counselor at law
in this state unless the person:
(1) is at least eighteen (18) years of age;
(2) is of good moral character;*
(3) has designated the Clerk of the Supreme Court as the applicant's agent
or service of process for all purposes;
(4) has received a juris doctor or equivalent degree from a law school
approved for accreditation by the American Bar Association;
(5) has complied with either Rule 3 or Rule 4; and
(6) has paid all ,required fees.
Id. Rule 3 discusses admission by examination and related procedures. Id. at R. 3. Rule 4
gives the requirements and procedure for admission by motion or attorney's exam. Id. at R.
4.
85. Braun, supra note 80, at 10.
86. Letter From the State Bar Board to Dean Jeremy Davis of the University of North
Dakota School of Law (Feb. 11, 1992) (discussing the new policy).
Previously, applications were not processed by the NCBE for character evaluations
unless the applicant was an individual who never lived or worked in the State of North
Dakota, thereby making it unfeasible for the North Dakota State Bar Board staff to process
the applicant. Telephone Interview with Carla Kolling, State Bar Board, Bismarck, North
Dakota (May 8, 1992).
87. The questions range from, "Have you ever been addicted to or treated for, or
counseled concerning the use of any drug, including alcohol?" to "Have you ever had a
credit card revoked?" National Conference of Bar Examiners Application 11 (1992).
88. Id. at 9-12. A release of one's medical records must be signed if there has been an
affirmative answer to the questions inquiring about substance addiction and related
treatment, as well as treatment concerning emotional or mental conditions. Id. at 11.

